«Mother India» extended a USD 100 million Line of Credit to Mauritius in order to facilitate the procurement of Indian defence equipment, as the two countries signed the «landmark» Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Partnership Agreement. The agreement was the highlight of External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s 4-day visit to our country; a high-profile visit which ends today.

Much has been said these past few days about India’s strategic vision for the sub-region, which seeks through SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) to differentiate India’s leadership from the modus operandi of major powers such as France, US, China and Japan. ‘‘The security of Mauritius is the security of India; the prosperity of Mauritius is our prosperity,” insisted Jaishankar, hence underscoring India’s SAGAR policy, as unveiled by Narendra Modi in March 2015 during his visit to Mauritius.

We all agree that to meet the development challenges facing Mauritius, strategies should include a maritime or oceanic dimension. A comprehensive maritime strategy with the help of India – and other international key partners – can enable communities, states and our sub-region to fully utilize maritime domain resources to achieve human security and sustainable development. However, it is equally critical to assess the various security threats emanating from the maritime domain, which is one of evolving geostrategic importance.

Maritime threats are complex and impact a variety of stakeholders. These threats include pollution, oil and chemical spills (Wakashio); lack of salvage equipment (Sir Gaëtan tugboat); illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; resource theft (‘bois de rose’); trafficking of both humans and goods, including arms and narcotics; illegal immigration; piracy and insecurity of navigation routes; climate change and coastal erosion; and environmental degradation, which includes reckless and destructive fishing practices, illegal dumping (including toxic waste), among others.

Beyond these tangible threats, there are also challenges of state capacity, for a small and weak economy like Mauritius. Generally, governments in our sub-region lack workable contingency plans for addressing maritime threats. This institutional weakness is further compounded by structural challenges of political instability and corruption.

In addition to these direct maritime threats and institutional challenges that undermine response capabilities, there are other challenges that must be accounted for: chronic undersurveillance by states of their territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); the inability of many states to equip and sustain a capable maritime force; international obligations like maritime safety and search and rescue capabilities; poor coordination and communication between stakeholders in the maritime domain; and lack of political will in governments to prioritize and commit resources to this undertaking, which competes for scarce resources with other national and regional priorities – Blue Economy versus Metro Express for instance…

The threats and challenges listed above, both operational and institutional, are numerous, yet not exhaustive. Such complexity must be thoroughly assessed and understood in order to devise comprehensive and workable strategies to address maritime threats and challenges. It is critical that threat assessments at the national and regional level must be prioritized in order to inform strategies that, by necessity, must be collaborative.

Blue Economy sounds like a great idea. But for this idea to achieve success, we need a clear Risk Assessment which is a critical piece of any maritime strategy development. Only this Risk Assessment can compare the gap between the chosen aims and objectives, with the risks and sacrifices needed to achieve them. Finally, we should insist on the need for regional cooperation. While it is recognized that maritime crimes are not unique to any one state and that harmful effects are suffered by all, most countries in our sub-region (except maybe for La Réunion) do not have the means to develop shared plans of action to secure their waters. Hence the disconnect between the responsibilities that states agree undertake in agreements or treaties and their willingness or capabilities to implement them.